The Israeli Intelligence Community and its Decision Makers

The Heads of Mossad and Secret Service (Shin Beth) are subordinate to the Prime Minister. The Head of military intelligence subordinates to the Minister of Defense via the Chief of the General Staff. The rationale behind this division in power is to prevent on center of power, which may threaten democracy. There are weekly working meetings between the Prime Minister and the Director General of the Mossad. In addition, “virtual” participants all took part in the weekly meetings including the military secretary, stenographer, tape recorder, etc. Regardless of these meetings, time constraints affect the agenda, only allowing time for the most important topics of reporting and/or decisions. It is crucial that there are strong inter-personal dynamics between the Prime Minister and the Director General of the Mossad. Other meetings consisted of Tet-A-Tet (private) personal meetings. Direct reporting and/or recommendations to the Prime Minister have no second shot or appeal.

Mossad’s mandate is to collect intelligence. Only abroad, every Mossad operative infringes on the sovereignty of other countries. The damage factor for mistakes in exportation. Mutual backing and trust between the Prime Minister and the Director General of the Mossad is a prerequisite to an organizational culture of perusing excellence. To achieve this, the Prime Minister prefers to go through the demanding process of choosing a successor. This is a complex decision for the Prime Mister to make with high stakes. The chosen successor must be the best suited for the job, and it cannot be erroneous since there are no trial periods.

Yitzhak Shamir was the seventh Prime Minister of Israel and held office during the first Gulf War in 1991. President George Bush requested that Shamir not activate the IDF. During the first Gulf War 39 Iraqi Squd Missiles hit Israeli soil. In response, the Israeli cabinet demanded intervention. However, Shamir stood firmly against military action. The decision against military intervention, rather than in favor of it, can be harder for a leader to make.

Prior to the First Gulf War, King Hussein of Jordon and Shamir had an understanding of mutual trust and support.

Friday, November 3rd, 1995 was the day before the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. There were two parallel tracks with the OSLO talks and the Israeli Jordanian Peace negotiation. The assassination ended the anti-violence rally which supported the OSLO peace talks. Peace with Jordan is the pinnacle of Rabin’s achievement during his leadership.

The presence of radical Islam terrorist organizations was an obstacle to peace. Further, there was the dilemma of unbiased evaluation of the adversary’s intentions.

There is also the complexity of political ethics versus professional ethics. More so, there is the divide between unavoidable burden versus quality of time. It is also necessary to understand capabilities versus intentions. “VARASH” is the Head of the Intelligence Services Committee and is responsible for the Division of Labor among the three main intelligence services in Israel.

The Agranat Commission was put together to enquire into the Yom-Kippur War. This dictated pluralism in intelligence research and evaluation. The military intelligence interpretation turned to pluralism. The research and evaluation of the Yom-Kippur War taught the Head of the Intelligence Services that an intelligence blunder can have lethal costs. Military intelligence evaluations post the Yom-Kippur War of the prior analyses were less than satisfactory. In response, the “Strategic Team” was formed.