The Role of Intelligence in the Middle East Conflict

First lesson in Middle East intelligence: Year 2 term paper at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem on the topic of social movements in the Middle East (Aug. 1963). My topic: the al-Najjada movement headed by Attorney Nimr al-Hawari, which was the main opposition to the al-Futtuwa movement of the Husayni family, the ruling elite of the Palestinians during the period between the two world wars and until the War of Independence.

The two movements were semi-military youth movements and not exactly social movements. The motive for the establishment of the al-Najjada movement was recognition of the need to establish an Arab force to weigh against the "Hagana"

What convinced Prof. Bar to approve the topic of my paper was the irresistible temptation that I presented him with: Archive files from SHAI (Hagana Intelligence unit) from the period when the Shin Bet was at its disposal. Original al-Najjada files - material plundered during the War of Independence that were lying in the state archives and I was the first to dust off their covers.

Writing this term paper was my first lesson in the art of basic intelligence, which is mostly achieved through human intelligence - operators on the one hand and agents on the other hand.

Extensive territorial deployment and the ongoing construction of intelligence images with the most detailed resolution, enabling intelligence coverage of changes that occur in a dynamic environment.

Even at this early stage, I was allowed to determine that the "aircraft carrier" of the profession or art of intelligence is human intelligence, which is first seen in the biblical story of Josef and his brothers in Egypt. And why? Because human intelligence is the only discipline in the field of intelligence in which one can ask the source questions and receive an answer.

I stress this point in particular in the context of an era in which we worship technology and invest in it the lion's share of the intelligence budget. I want to stress another point: since human intelligence involves a dialogue between the operator and his source, it constitutes the most promising discipline for examining the enemy's true intentions.

Characteristics of the conflict are; being longer than any other conflict on earth, the numerical gap between the sides is larger than in any other conflict, one state versus one entity + 20 other countries, a conflict over the same territory of which both sides claim ownership, and one democracy versus authoritarian regimes.

These differences have influenced in the past, and continue to influence today, the role or roles of intelligence. The central characteristic of the role of intelligence in this conflict, as compared to other conflicts in the world, is its heterogeneity and pluralism. If war theory holds that you need to gather intelligence about the enemy's intentions and capabilities, and prepare a response based on them, when you translate this concept to the Middle East conflict you immediately recognize an asymmetry in terms of the intentions and capabilities of the various players in the coalition that stands against us.

The Middle East conflict is a complex and convoluted matrix. The first variable and basic element of the matrix is territory. We tend to talk about territorial circles of the conflict. In the first/internal circle, the immediate opponent is the Palestinians; in the first external circle are the countries that surround us: Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt; in the second circle we have Iraq, the Gulf States, Yemen, Sudan and the countries of North Africa; in the third circle are Iran and Pakistan.

We said that the role of intelligence is to provide decision makers and security forces with the optimal intelligence response on two planes:

The capabilities plane, meaning all elements of the opponent's strength (in our case, one entity + over 20 countries): its military, economic, social, political (internal and foreign) and technological power as well as its national resilience.

The intentions plane, meaning the intentions of each member of the coalition against us, and here we face a small problem. In democratic countries with an open society, it is not difficult for a professional intelligence agency to uncover the enemy's intentions. This is not the case when it comes to countries with authoritarian regimes, in which there is usually a small number of individuals who are privy to those intentions. Sometimes the intentions are known only to the leader. President Sadat updated his commanders on the exact date of the launch of the Yom Kippur War, only a few days before D-Day. The coalition that stands against us includes the Palestinians (a non-state entity) and over 20 Arab countries.

The intensity of hatred, as well as the degree of commitment and involvement of each of the countries in the coalition, differ from one another, which further complicates the discovery and identification of their intentions against us, and our ability to accurately assess the threat that they pose to us.

In an intelligence war, each side does its best to preserve its secrets. The example of the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War is an interesting case study involving outlooks on field security that span both ends of the spectrum. The differences in their outlooks resulted from the fact that the US was an open society while the Soviet Union was a dictatorship.

The Soviets decided that 100% of their information must be kept secret and, therefore, they put all of the information (figuratively speaking) into an opaque black box under fierce protection. The Americans decided to protect only 5% of all of their information in a black box, the same information that they estimated would gravely harm the power of the state if it was exposed. The rest of the information they did not protect.

In an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages inherent to each model, it may be said that the black box model of the Soviet Union was good as long as the box was sealed. The problem is that one little breach exposes all of the wealth of information found inside it.

The American model claims that only 5% of your secrets can be much better protected inside the small box and, regarding the rest of the information, it can be assumed that it will be very difficult for the enemy to identify the real signal from the vast cacophony available to everyone.

In applying the powerful model from the Cold War era to the Middle East conflict, one may assume or hope that the noise emanating from the State of Israel makes it hard for the enemy to understand our true intentions.

The terrorism variable has been part of the Zionist experience in Israel since the immigration of the Biluim to Israel in the late 19th century. Since then, terrorism constitutes one of the central characteristics of the conflict as it has changed its shape and form throughout our over 100 years of existence in the Land of Israel. At first terrorism was local and, over time, it became a global phenomenon. At first it was secular and, over time, it became radically religious. At first it was political and expressed aspirations to self-determination and political independence and, over time, it became theological and expressed aspirations to a sharia state in the world of the Kingdom of Allah. At first the impact of terrorism was primarily local and today it is global. In an analysis of the roles of intelligence in combating terrorism, it is uniquely clear that intelligence is not required in order to determine intentions; the intention is clear - the destruction of the State of Israel.

The entire intelligence effort is directed at tactical early warning and capabilities.

A central discipline in the world of intelligence is that the exchange of information between friendly intelligence services leads to joint operations as long as the collaboration is deep and intimate.

There exists an "exchange" of information in the world with buyers and sellers. The buyers try to buy cheaply and the sellers try to sell at a high price. This "exchange" usually operates on the basis of one buyer versus one seller.

Sometimes, based on the existence of common interests, there are more than two sides in each intelligence transaction. It should be emphasized that there is not necessarily a full symmetry between the political interests of both countries and between the intelligence interests of the two intelligence systems of those countries.

The golden rule in the global exchange is called the "third party principle", which holds that the buyer cannot sell the information that he purchased to a third party without the seller's consent. There is no guarantee that this rule is meticulously followed but if and when those who violate this principle are exposed, their reputation is damaged and members of the exchange avoid selling to them or demand exorbitant prices from them.

The players in the exchange must be very sensitive to the possibility that another member may be trying to sell them tendentious intelligence aimed at misleading them or leading them to make erroneous conclusions that serve the purpose of the seller; in other words, the use of intelligence for purposes of psychological warfare and/or fraud.

The "third party principle" in our relationship with our greatest ally, the United States, is worth a short discussion. During the period of the Cold War (1945-1990), the boundaries of intelligence cooperation between us and the Americans were crisp and clear.

In a bipolar world where each of the two superpowers had its own camp of allied countries, it was clear and understood that the United States would not share intelligence with us about Saudi Arabia, Jordan or the Gulf States, for example, nor about Egypt following the Yom Kippur War (1973) when Egypt became an important US ally in the Middle East, nor about Turkey, which was not only a US ally but also a member of NATO.

In the British government, the foreign intelligence service - the MI-6 - is subject to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and not to the Prime Minister as is the practice in most Western democracies. Throughout history and to this day, this subordination has dictated a complete symmetry between the principles of British policy towards the countries of the Middle East and the intelligence cooperation between those countries and Britain.

It is easy to understand that British foreign policy, which gave preference to its relationship with Arab countries over its relationship with Israel, directly impacted the intelligence ties between the countries.

The characteristics of intelligence cooperation changed for the better following the end of the Cold War era and the collapse of the Soviet Union as components of the threat facing Britain and Israel became similar, mainly with respect to radical Islamic terrorism and the proliferation of non-conventional weapons (WMD's).

The end of the Cold War era marked an important milestone for the Israeli intelligence community in general, and for the Mossad in particular. During the Cold War era, the Israeli intelligence community was a regional system that covered the territories of the Middle East and Europe here and there, and according to occasional special needs, Israeli intelligence spread its wings to other parts of the world but always made certain to return to its regional dimensions.

The geo-strategic changes that took place at the end of the Cold War marked a relatively sharp transition from a bipolar world to a multi-polar world. The blocs of countries surrounding the two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) split and unraveled. The main topics of discourse were reduced to an issue of interest to most of the players, namely radical Islam and global terrorism and the proliferation of WMD's. This change required that the Mossad in particular expand its deployment and operations to the wider world. Iran's build-up of unconventional weapons was, and still is, dependent on the supply of information, technology, advice and raw materials from around the world - beginning in China and North Korea, through India, Pakistan and Russia, and ending in Western Europe and South America. Since this issue has become central in the Israeli discourse, it is not surprising that Israeli intelligence has spread its wings to these regions. Radical Islam and global terrorism have become a threat to the entire Western world and beyond.

The deployment of the Mossad became global and it required a response in accordance with means and capabilities in addition to deployment.

The era after the Cold War created strange intelligence coalitions that would never have previously been considered, such as intelligence ties between the Mossad and Russia or China. Another important change that resulted from the geo-strategic environment following the Cold War era was a significant upgrade in the cooperation between friendly intelligence services.

If, in the past, cooperation was characterized by an exchange of intelligence material and research sessions, then in the post-Cold War era cooperation jumped a level to include operational cooperation in which the cooperating sides agreed to disclose to one another operational tools, doctrine and even sources.

This jump was inevitable. In the case of global terrorism, the world very quickly understood that if it wanted to successfully fight terrorism then it had no choice but to utilize operational cooperation.

In terms of non-conventional weapons, the issue by definition presents a threat to global stability and, therefore, requires that each party facing an actual or potential threat cooperate with one another in order to cope with the threat. Another reason is that intelligence services, especially in the West, realized that they were getting in each other's way and hampering one another while trying to cope with the threat, and the only effective way to avoid this and to improve the method was through operational cooperation that makes it possible to coordinate sector boundaries and division of labor.

Iran is the most prominent example of change to the characteristics of the conflict over time. Iran was an ally of Israel since the establishment of the country until the Khomeini revolution in 1979 when it became the greatest threat to the State of Israel to the point of presenting an existential threat.

We can understand and appreciate the depth of this change if we remind ourselves that Iran used to be a cornerstone to Israel's concept of national security, as expressed in Israel's regional alliances with Iran and Turkey in the north, and with Ethiopia and Sudan (and later Morocco) in the south. If we had to define the nature of the non-conventional Iranian threat to Israel in one sentence, it could be summarized by the following question:

If and when Iran will achieve nuclear capability, will the decisions made by its leadership be rational or messianic?

The amount of intelligence attention and resources that the State of Israel has invested in the issue of a non-conventional threat since its establishment is unprecedented when compared to any other issue in the national discourse.

It is important to remember that the build-up WMD's in the Middle East was a fixed variable for monitoring and prevention by intelligence and security agencies despite the fact that the issue only made it into the public consciousness and discourse at peaks where it burst through the glass ceiling that kept the noise at bay. We must remind ourselves, with a very short overview, of the continuity of the threat since the establishment of the state; Nasser's chemical attacks in Yemen; the episode involving the German scientists in Egypt in the mid-1960's; the build-up of Iraqi WMD's and the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds; the Egyptian surface-to-surface missile project - the "Condor" - in the 1980's; the aid provided by Pakistan, North Korea, China and the Soviet Union to several Arab countries in the field of WMD's; the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor; and the bombing of the Syrian reactor.

The State of Israel has learned to cope with the threat of WMD's since its establishment and until today, in the intelligence realm, the operative-defensive and offensive realm, an the international political and PR realm. However, this does not mean that we can rest or our laurels.

As technology continues to advance in the world - and it is advancing in leaps and bounds - it affects the magnitude of the threat. Every variable in the field of WMD's has become more deadly; speed increases; accuracy increases; miniaturization evolves; carrying and lifting capacity increases; warning time decreases, etc. In the foreseeable future I do not see the possibility of reducing the resources allocated to improving the response to the threat of non-conventional weapons against the State of Israel.

It is hard to give the State of Israel a similar score when it comes to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. However, I want to exclude intelligence from this and I maintain that all of Israel'sintelligence services performed their part well since the pre-state era until today. Permit me to go back to my first lesson in Middle East intelligence that I referred to in the introduction to my lecture. The SHAI files that I was exposed to during my studies at the Hebrew University were a model of intelligence work that presented a perfect picture of Arabs living in Israel in the 1940's according to several criteria, the main one being a territory criterion.

The only tool at SHAl's disposal was human intelligence and, to a certain extent, the Arab press (OSINT).

SHAI succeeded in building a database of village files, each of which could have served as an intelligence officer's "wet dream". Each file contained everything that an intelligence officer needed in order to plan action of any kind against a village and every piece of information that allowed him to present recommendations to decision makers on political and strategic issues.

Historically, we can salute SHAI coordinators (as they used to be called "RACAZIM") for professional activity of the highest caliber in the field of intelligence gathering.

professional activity of the highest caliber in the field of intelligence gathering.

silet coordinators (as they used to be called "RACAZIM for professional activity of the highest caliber in the field of intelligence gathering.

There are commentators and philosophers who say with more than a touch of malice that intelligence exists in order to make mistakes. I claim that intelligence has done and continues to do its job so that decision makers can make the correct decisions. The problem is that every political, tactical or strategic decision made in terms of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the result of the decision maker's political perspective. Therefore, the proper

Staff- work involved in decision making (defining goals, intelligence, possible courses of action, advantages and disadvantages, preferred course of action; decision) is not applicable in this case because it is impossible to isolate it from the political global perspective of the decision maker.

When I come to translate the political outlook and vision of the Israeli left and right into the language of a practitioner and not a politician, I am faced with the question: What is the level of risk that each side (right and left) is willing to take in order to ensure the existence of the Jewish Nation in the State of Israel as a Jewish democratic state, while at the same time providing an appropriate response to the demands of the Palestinians? If we analyze the conflict using a risk assessment we can determine a preferred course of action for most of the issues involved in the conflict. However, we are left with what I call "soft issues" that are enshrined in the set of values and in the historical memory of each side. How to deal with them is a topic for another lecture but let us not forget that in a historical analysis from the end of the First World War until today, the graph of Israel's advances - territorial, demographic, economic, military and international - have been on a constant rise.

I am not saying this for the sake of lyrical beauty but rather to broadcast a message of strength and to say that there are larger safety margins and a wider range of options at our disposal when it comes to strengthening our position.

A few words about the intelligence cooperation between enemies/opponents: The United Nations was able to invent a unique tool for dealing with disputes between nations. It established an international peacekeeping army. This army was also designed to serve as a buffer between fighters in conflicts between countries as well as a mediator between the parties to the conflict. By meeting very specific conditions, this army receives authorization from the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Security Council to operate as a military force. In the Middle East conflict, the United Nations - with the agreement of all sides - used this army in every place where we have a shared border with our enemies. Under the guise of this military force, they developed direct intelligence and security ties with intelligence and security agencies of our enemies-neighbors. The intensity of these ties resulted from the shared interests of both sides. The level of cooperation was lowest when all both sides wanted was to maintain quiet on both sides of the border. The level of cooperation was highest when both sides faced a third enemy that posed greater potential risk and damage to both sides than that posed by the enmity between the two sides themselves. An example of the first scenario is Israel's borders with Syria and Lebanon. An example of the second scenario is the threat of Hamas and Islamic Jihad to Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Another example of the second scenario is Jordan and Egypt - here too the cooperation is against radical Islam. Jordan and Egypt do not need the umbrella of the United Nations because there is peace between these countries and Israel. It will be interesting to see what will happen to Palestinian-Israeli cooperation as a result of the PLO agreement with Hamas!

One of the roles of intelligence in the Middle East conflict was, and still is, to try to identify and encourage intentions and trends among our enemies aimed at an acceptance of our existence and a willingness to enter negotiations and peace talks with us. In the examples of Egypt and Jordan, intelligence was responsible for identifying a willingness for peace talks, convincing the leaders of that time - Begin and Rabin, may they rest in peace - and

tha nenross in the fovnt eyamole and actively partnering in the negotiations until the signing of a peace ageeement in the Jordan example.

With regard to the issue of Israel's intelligence relationships with other countries, the Mossad has an advantage relative to other intelligence agencies due to the structure and subservience of the heads of intelligence and security services to the leaders of the State. In the majority of countries in the world, the heads of intelligence services are either subordinate to, and report directly to, the head of State or they do so in through very short reporting channels. Intelligence relations between states are secret by definition. Due to the nature of the relationship it is easy to assume that the boundaries between intelligence issues and political issues sometimes become obscured, including the transfer of messages between the leaders of two states. Moreover, to this day there are quite a few countries in the world that, for political and other reasons, do not have diplomatic relations with Israel but maintain contact through intelligence channels.

In these cases, the representative of the institution in charge of the relationship is the representative of Israel for all intents and purposes, and not only for intelligence. The structure, in which the representative of the institution maintains a presence in the territory as well as a dialogue with those individuals closest to the head of State and sometimes to the leader himself, gives the institution an advantage in evaluating the intentions of these countries and the ability to alert the leaders of any changes before any other entity.

I did not touch upon the intelligence implications of the "Arab Spring", of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and of the cyber revolution. All of these have far-reaching implications for Israeli intelligence, which the other speakers at the conference are meant to discuss.

Thank you very much.